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Abstract
This paper develops a new challenge for moral noncognitivism. In brief, the
challenge is this: beliefs—both moral and non-moral—are epistemically evaluable,
whereas desires are not. It is tempting to explain this dierence in terms of dif-
ferences in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. However, this explanation
stands in tension with noncognitivism, which maintains that moral beliefs have a
desire-like functional role. After critically reviewing some initial responses to the
challenge, I suggest a solution, which involves rethinking the functional relation-
ship between desire and belief.
1 Noncognitivism as Boxology
In simpler times, it was easy to distinguish moral cognitivists from noncognitivists. Cog-
nitivists believed in moral beliefs; noncognitivists did not.1 But these days most noncog-
nitivists want to ‘save the appearances’ of cognitivism: they want to allow that belief
reports such as ‘Jane believes that stealing is wrong’ can be true. Semantically descend-
ing, most contemporary noncognitivists are willing to say that there are moral beliefs.2
How, then, are we to tell the two views apart? While contemporary noncognitivists
allow for moral beliefs, they typically hold that moral beliefs are much more similar
to desires than they are to prosaic beliefs (grass is green and the like).3 In particular,
noncognitivists usually maintain that all it is to believe that stealing is wrong is to have
some conative attitude towards stealing, for example, to desire that no one steals, or to
disapprove of stealing, etc.
Given this, it’s natural to interpret noncognitivism as a thesis about the functional
role of moral beliefs. Let the ‘B-Role’ refer to the functional role of prosaic beliefs. Let
the ‘D-Role’ refer to the functional role of desires. Noncognitivism amounts to the view
that the functional role of moral beliefs resembles the D-Role much more closely than
the B-Role. (See Fig. 1.) On this view, belief isn’t a natural psychological kind: just as
1For inuential statements of ‘old-school’ noncognitivism, see Ayer 1936: 108; Russell 1935: 231–232.
2See, for example, Blackburn 1993, 1998; Gibbard 2003.
3I borrow the term ‘prosaic’ from Gibbard (2003), who uses it to refer to non-normative beliefs.
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Figure 1: Dueling Boxologies
‘jade’ picks out both jadeite and nephrite, so ‘belief’ picks out both prosaic belief and
some desire-like state.4
While seldom formulated in exactly these terms, it’s common to nd noncognitivism
characterized along roughly these lines. For example, a number of authors characterize
noncognitivism as the view that moral beliefs have a desire-like direction of t.5 Accord-
ing to this characterization, prosaic beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of t: they
aim to accurately represent the world. Moral beliefs are like desires in that they have
world-to-mind direction of t: they aim not to represent the world, but to change it. If
we understand the dierence between two states’ direction of t as a dierence between
their functional roles (as many of these authors do), then this way of understanding
noncognitivism amounts to a version of my boxological construal.6
4For the analogy with jade, see Ridge 2009, 2014.
5E.g., Ridge 2006a; Schroeder 2010: chp.5; Zangwill 2011; Streumer 2013; Björnsson and McPherson
2014.
6Why focus on functional roles, rather than direction of t? Mainly to forestall confusion. Some authors
prefer to understand direction of t in explicitly normative terms (Anscombe 1957; Platts 1979; Shafer-
Landau 2003; Gregory 2012). On such views, a state’s direction of t is not a matter of its functional role;
instead, it’s a matter of whether that state ought to conform to the world, or whether the world ought
to conform to it. Furthermore, even those who understand direction of t in non-normative terms often
construe this notion in very dierent ways. (Compare, for example, the account provided by Smith (1987,
1994) with the ‘higher-order’ approach in Humberstone 1992.) Thus to prevent confusion, I’ll formulate my
discussion entirely in terms of functional roles, leaving others to translate it into ‘direction of t’ talk as
they see t.
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A boxological characterization of noncognitivism also seems natural in light of the
arguments that noncognitivists employ. A standard argument for noncognitivism starts
by appealing to motivational internalism: the thesis that there is a necessary connection
between having a moral belief and being motivated to act on it. This is then conjoined
with a Humean theory of motivation, according to which motivation requires the pres-
ence of a desire. This ‘Argument from Motivation’, whatever its merits, naturally sug-
gests a conception of noncognitivism along the lines I’ve sketched—as the view that the
functional role of moral beliefs closely resembles that of desires.7
In this paper, I present a new challenge for noncognitivism, thus construed: the
Epistemic Evaluability Challenge. The challenge starts with the observation that both
moral and prosaic beliefs are epistemically evaluable, whereas prototypical desires are
not. It’s tempting to explain this dierence in epistemic evaluability in terms of some
dierence in the functional roles of beliefs and desires. But this explanation stands in
tension with the noncognitivist idea that the functional role of moral beliefs resembles
the D-Role far more closely than the B-Role.
This paper proceeds as follows. §2 develops the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge in
more detail. §§3-6 consider initial responses to the challenge and nd them wanting. §7
develops what I take to be the most promising response. The response I advocate is to
advance a new version of noncognitivism—what I call ‘grounding noncognitivism.’ On
this view, moral and prosaic beliefs have the same functional role. What distinguishes
moral from prosaic beliefs is that the former are fully grounded in desire-like states. I
suggest that this view may oer just what is needed to resolve the challenge.
2 The Epistemic Evaluability Challenge
2.1 The Challenge Expounded
Prosaic beliefs are epistemically evaluable. In everyday life, we talk about whether pro-
saic beliefs amount to knowledge—an epistemic evaluation par excellence. We also epis-
temically evaluate prosaic beliefs in other ways—as rational or irrational, as justied or
unjustied.
By contrast, prototypical desires do not seem to be epistemically evaluable. Suppose I
desire to slake my thirst. Perhaps this desire can be evaluated as rational or irrational, as
justied or unjustied. But if so, it seems to be practical rationality and justication that’s
at issue. Moreover, describing a desire as an item of knowledge seems like a category
mistake: I can know that I want a drink, but my want isn’t itself an item of knowledge.
This raises what I’ll call the ‘Epistemic Evaluability Question’ (EEQ):
EEQ Why are beliefs epistemically evaluable, whereas desires are not?
7For uses of the Argument from Motivation, see e.g., Stevenson 1937: 16; Blackburn 1998: 61; Gibbard
2003: chp.7. Of course, it remains controversial whether motivational internalism is true, as well as whether
its truth would support noncognitivism. For relevant discussion, see Darwall et al. 1992; Svavarsdóttir 1999;
Björnsson et al. 2015.
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It’s natural to try to answer EEQ in terms of functional roles. More precisely:
Functional Role Hypothesis Beliefs are epistemically evaluable in virtue of some fea-
tures of their functional role. Desires lack these features, and so are not apt for
epistemic evaluation.
Two points of clarication are in order. First, the Functional Role Hypothesis does
not claim that beliefs are the only epistemically evaluable states. At the very least, we
should allow that degrees of belief are epistemically evaluable. My .5 credence that it
will rain can be epistemically rational; on some views, it can even constitute knowledge
(Moss 2013). One might also maintain that a psychological state can be epistemically
evaluated—at least in certain respects—if it entails having some belief, or some degree
of belief. For example, fearing that a burglar will break in seems to entail having a non-
negligible credence that a burglar will break in. Perhaps if it’s epistemically irrational to
have a non-negligible credence that a burglar will break in, this makes the corresponding
fear epistemically irrational. None of this is ruled out by the Functional Role Hypothesis.
Second, the Functional Role Hypothesis does not tell us which features of the B-Role
suce for epistemic evaluability. To see how one might esh out the Functional Role
Hypothesis, it is worth taking a brief excursus through standard functionalist accounts
of belief. On standard accounts, the functional role of belief includes input and output
conditions. The input conditions are often thought to involve some connection between
beliefs and appearances, e.g.:
Ceteris paribus, if it appears to someone that p, they’ll be at least somewhat disposed
to believe p.8
The output conditions are usually thought to include some link between belief and ac-
tion, e.g.:
Ceteris paribus, if someone believes p, they’ll be disposed to treat p as true for the
purposes of practical reasoning.9
This bare-bones story could be complicated in various ways. One could add fur-
ther input and output conditions. One could also add internal role conditions specifying
connections between beliefs and other mental states.10
Let C be some input, output, or internal role condition, or some combination of such
conditions. There will be a possible view that maintains C is what makes beliefs epis-
temically evaluable. Of course, some candidate conditions will be more plausible than
8See Loar 1981 and Smith 1987. A closely related suggestion is that the input conditions include some
connection between beliefs and evidence. I discuss this proposal in more detail in §5.3.
9This statement of the connection between belief and action is rather vague, and there are various op-
tions for formulating it more precisely (an issue that I take up in §7). For discussion, see Armstrong 1973;
Loar 1981; Stalnaker 1984; Railton 2014, among many others.
10See, for example, Schwitzgebel 2002.
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others. My own suspicion is that any plausible candidate will include some reference to
the connection between belief and action.11 However, there’s no need to prejudge this
issue. All that the Functional Role Hypothesis requires is that the epistemic evaluability
of a state (or lack thereof) is explained by some features of that state’s functional role; it
does not take a stand on which features bear the explanatory load.
Our clarications complete, we are now in a position to see why the Functional Role
Hypothesis stands in tension with noncognitivism. According to our boxological con-
strual, noncognitivism maintains that the functional role of moral belief resembles the D-
Role much more closely than the B-Role. Given the Functional Role Hypothesis, noncog-
nitivists seem to be committed to the conclusion that moral beliefs are not epistemically
evaluable.
But this is surely wrong. Our everyday conversation is rife with talk of moral knowl-
edge. We say things like, ‘You knew you shouldn’t have done that’; we talk about teach-
ing children to know the dierence between right and wrong. Our practice of ascribing
moral knowledge is even enshrined in the law. Take, for example, the M’Naghten rule,
which makes criminal liability dependent on whether the accused knew that their action
was wrong.
Arguably, moral beliefs can be epistemically evaluated in other ways as well. It’s
natural to describe moral beliefs as rational or irrational, justied or unjustied: ‘It’s ir-
rational to believe that euthanasia is wrong’; ‘He was justied in thinking it was the right
course of action.’ Admittedly, it’s less clear whether these descriptions are distinctly epis-
temic evaluations. Perhaps, some may suggest, when we describe moral beliefs in these
ways, we’re really talking about practical justication/rationality. However, I think there
are grounds for push-back. In the epistemology literature, it’s widely held that in order
for a belief to amount to knowledge, it must be epistemically justied/rational; practical
justication/rationality is not enough.12 Indeed, some have even proposed dening epis-
temic rationality as the species of rationality required for knowledge.13 If these views
are correct, then any moral belief that qualies as knowledge will also qualify as epis-
temically justied/rational.
Common sense, then, takes moral beliefs to be epistemically evaluable. They qual-
ify as knowledge; arguably, they also qualify as epistemically rational and epistemically
justied. In these regards, they resemble prosaic beliefs and dier from prototypical de-
sires. Noncognitivists who seek to accommodate the realist trappings of moral thought
must either provide an alternative answer to EEQ—an answer that doesn’t make epis-
11While desires play a role in guiding action, their role is fundamentally dierent. Desiring p does not
dispose one to treat p as true; rather, it disposes one to make p true. More on this in §7.
12We can motivate this by considering cases where the practical rationality of a belief pulls apart from its
epistemic rationality. Suppose Jones believes that he will win the race, even though his evidence strongly
indicates he will lose. Suppose, moreover, that this belief gives him a burst of condence, causing him to
win. At the start of the race, Jones’ belief is practically rational, in virtue of its benecial consequences.
Intuitively, however, his belief does not qualify as knowledge. And the reason for this seems to be that it is
epistemically irrational.
13See e.g., Schroeder 2015.
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temic evaluability dependent on functional role—or explain how, despite appearances,
the Functional Role Hypothesis can be reconciled with noncognitivism. Call this the
‘Epistemic Evaluability Challenge.’
The Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is rst and foremost a problem for noncogni-
tivism. Is it also a problem for expressivism? This depends on how one conceives the
relation between expressivism and noncognitivism. Typically, expressivism is charac-
terized as the thesis that moral discourse does not purport to represent the world. While
expressivism and noncognitivism often march hand-in-hand, at least some writers have
argued they can be separated. For example, Horgan and Timmons (2006) advocate a
‘cognitivist expressivism’, which combines an expressivist semantics with a cognitivist
boxology. I will not take a stand on whether this is a stable combination. However,
insofar as it is, the view evades the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge.14
In the rest of this section, I further clarify the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge by
considering two natural concerns. The rst is that the challenge has already been solved.
In a number of places, Blackburn and Gibbard have sketched noncognitivist accounts of
moral knowledge, which some might think can be used to answer the Epistemic Evalua-
bility Challenge. The second concern is that the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is not
a new challenge; rather, it is simply a new way of dressing up one of noncognitivism’s
more familiar headaches. Addressing these worries will put us in a better position to both
appreciate the novelty of the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge and assess what would
constitute a satisfactory response.
2.2 Noncognitivist Accounts of Moral Knowledge
Whereas old-school noncognitivists would be happy to chalk our everyday attributions
of moral knowledge up to speaker error, contemporary noncognitivists tend to be less
dismissive. Indeed, contemporary noncognitivists have gone some lengths towards ex-
plaining how desire-like states can satisfy the various conditions on knowledge.
In order to explain the truth condition on knowledge, noncognitivists typically main-
tain that ‘p is true’ is equivalent to ‘p’, and so someone who asserts the former expresses
whatever mental state would be expressed by asserting the latter.15 And so when I say,
‘Jane knows stealing is wrong’, I not only report that Jane desires (or prefers, etc.) that
people avoid stealing; I also express that I share her desire. In a similar vein, both Black-
burn (1996, 1998) and Gibbard (2003) develop noncognitivist glosses on a ‘No Defeaters’
condition. For example, Blackburn proposes that when I say that Jane’s belief is immune
14Recently, Chrisman (2008, 2016) has argued that traditional versions of expressivism should be replaced
with inferentialism—the view that the meanings of sentences should be explained in terms of their inferential
roles. On this view, the dierence between prosaic and moral sentences is that the former typically license
various prosaic conclusions, whereas the latter typically license various actions. There is an interesting
question as to how the inferential role of a sentence bears on the functional role of the underlying belief. I
will not tackle this question here. The important point is that insofar as inferentialists reject the idea that
moral beliefs have a desire-like functional role, they can also sidestep the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge.
15See Blackburn 1993, 1998; Gibbard 2003.
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to defeat, I am saying that no improvement in her epistemic position would undermine
her belief. Here the notions of ‘improvement’ and ‘undermining’ are themselves norma-
tive, and given an expressivist treatment.
While there are dicult questions about points of detail, I am happy to grant that a
strategy along these lines can succeed: noncognitivists may well be able to explain how
a moral belief can satisfy the various conditions on knowledge. But will doing so provide
a solution to the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge? I think not. After all, we still won’t
have explained why prototypical desires—e.g., my desire to slake my thirst—cannot sim-
ilarly satisfy these conditions. If some desire-like states can satisfy the conditions on
knowledge, why can’t they all do so?
To clarify: at this point, I am not claiming that this question is unanswerable. Indeed,
the rest of the paper will be devoted to assessing whether noncognitivists can provide
an answer. My point is that the answer does not simply fall out of the noncognitivist
accounts of moral knowledge proposed to date. And so even if we are happy to embrace
these accounts, the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge remains.
2.3 Why the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is Distinct
Noncognitivism already faces a long list of challenges; the Epistemic Evaluability Chal-
lenge is just the latest addition. But is it even an addition at all? Will a solution to one of
the more familiar challenges carry over to solve the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge?
In order to see why the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is importantly distinct, let us
briey compare it to some of the more familiar worries facing noncognitivists.
So far, the challenge that has received the most press is the Frege-Geach problem: the
problem of explaining the embedding behavior and semantic properties of moral terms.16
While discussions of the Frege-Geach problem have tended to focus on negation and
conditionals, a complete solution to the Frege-Geach problem should provide an analysis
of any sentence that embeds moral vocabulary. This would include moral belief reports,
as well as sentences that epistemically evaluate moral beliefs, for example:
(1) Jane
{
knows
rationally believes
}
that stealing is wrong.
It might be thought that an analysis of such sentences will ipso facto solve the Epistemic
Evaluability Challenge.
However, I think this is too quick. True, a complete solution to the Frege-Geach prob-
lem had better provide an analysis of sentences like (1). And in order to be recognizably
noncognitivist, this analysis had better entail that a speaker who utters (1) is epistemi-
cally evaluating one of Jane’s desire-like states. But even if such an analysis succeeds,
16For a classic statement of the problem, see Geach 1965; for an overview, see Schroeder 2008b. Strictly
speaking, the Frege-Geach Problem is a problem for expressivism rather than noncognitivism. However,
given the close connection between the two, I will ignore this dierence.
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it won’t necessarily tell us why we can epistemically evaluate this particular desire-like
state, but not her desire to quench her thirst.
Some may think that this reply overlooks an important facet of the Frege-Geach
problem. A full solution to the Frege-Geach problem requires explaining the semantic
relations between moral sentences, for example, why ‘Stealing is wrong’ is inconsistent
with ‘Stealing is not wrong.’ The standard expressivist strategy is to appeal to a no-
tion of ‘disagreement in attitude’: a disagreement that arises between conative attitudes
rather than prosaic beliefs.17 However, it is not clear that all clashes in conative attitudes
amount to a form of disagreement. Perhaps, then, if we can explain why some (but not
all) conative attitudes generate disagreement, we can leverage this into an explanation
of why some (but not all) conative attitudes are epistemically evaluable.
A full response to this suggestion will be left to §5, where I consider some of the most
promising candidates for desire-like states that generate disagreement in attitude—in
particular, preferences and plans.18 There I argue that these states also fail to be epis-
temically evaluable in the same ways as moral and prosaic beliefs. If this is right, then
just because a state generates disagreements does not mean that it is epistemically evalu-
able. And so even if we can explain inconsistency in terms of disagreement in attitude,
we still will not have solved the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge.19
The Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is also importantly dierent from Dorr’s (2002)
objection to noncognitivism. According to Dorr, noncognitivists have trouble explaining
why it’s rational to form beliefs on the basis of certain arguments that contain both moral
and prosaic premises. Imagine someone who goes through the following reasoning:
(2) If lying is wrong, then the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife.
(3) Lying is wrong.
(4) The souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife.
This person could be perfectly rational in so reasoning. But, Dorr contends, noncogni-
tivists have trouble accounting for this. After all, if noncognitivism is correct, this person
17For relevant discussion, see Stevenson 1944; Blackburn 1984; Gibbard 2003.
18Of course, it is controversial whether any satisfactory notion of disagreement in attitude is forthcoming.
(See e.g., Schroeder 2008a: chp 3; Beddor forthcoming for worries on this front.) For present purposes, I
will set such concerns aside.
19Two further remarks on the relation between the Frege-Geach problem and the Epistemic Evaluability
Challenge are in order. First, I am conceiving of the Frege-Geach problem as a relatively circumscribed
problem in semantics: it’s the problem of giving a compositional expressivist semantics for moral terms
that explains their semantic properties and embedding behavior. Others may conceive of the Frege-Geach
problem as a more general philosophical challenge to explain all of the properties of moral thought and
talk. Given this more liberal construal, I am happy to view the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge as a special
case of the Frege-Geach problem (though, for reasons that will become clear, I take it to be a particularly
dicult case). Second, I make no claim that the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is entirely independent
of the Frege-Geach problem, even on its more narrow semantic construal. Indeed, the positive proposal I
develop in §7 will build on aspects of Gibbard’s approach to Frege-Geach worries. The point is simply that
a solution to the latter problem will not automatically translate into a solution to the former.
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is forming a belief about the world on the basis of a desire-like attitude, which amounts
to a form of wishful thinking.
Dorr’s objection is similar to mine in that we both think that noncognitivists have
trouble explaining the epistemic statuses of moral beliefs. But Dorr’s focus is on whether
noncognitivists can vindicate our intuitive epistemic verdicts on specic forms of moral
reasoning. By contrast, the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge focuses on whether noncog-
nitivists can explain why moral beliefs are apt for epistemic evaluation in the rst place.
These are very dierent questions. This is not to say that there is no relation whatsoever
between them. Perhaps thinking carefully about the conditions under which a desire-like
attitude is epistemically rational will help us understand why some desire-like attitudes
are apt for epistemic appraisal, whereas others are not. However, there is no reason to
assume in advance that a solution to Dorr’s challenge will generalize smoothly into a
solution to the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge.20
Perhaps the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge’s closest cousin in the literature is a
challenge raised in passing by Schroeder (2010): the ‘Multiple Kinds Problem’ (96-97).
Schroeder observes that moral beliefs and prosaic beliefs have an awful lot in common.
He points out that if noncognitivism is correct, this is a massive coincidence, since, ac-
cording to noncognitivists, moral and prosaic beliefs are very dierent attitudes. The
Epistemic Evaluability Challenge could be viewed as a special instance of the Multiple
Kinds problem. However, it is a particularly thorny instance. Consider some of the other
properties shared by moral and prosaic beliefs: they can stand in relations of agreement
and disagreement; they can be coherent or incoherent; they are truth apt. It seems a state
can possess these properties without being epistemically evaluable. As noted above, ar-
guably preferences and plans stand in disagreement and coherence relations, but they
are not epistemically evaluable in the same ways that moral beliefs are. (Or so I’ll argue.)
Furthermore, suppositions and imaginings are truth apt, but do not seem to be epistemi-
cally evaluable. For example, if Jane supposes it’s raining in Florence, this supposition is
either true or false. But this supposition doesn’t seem like it could amount to knowledge.
If this is correct, then an explanation of these commonalities between prosaic and moral
belief will not necessarily yield an explanation of their mutual epistemic evaluability.
Having claried the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge, let us now consider how noncog-
nitivists might try to answer it.
20To bolster this point, note that many of the proposed solutions to Dorr’s challenge do not generalize to
solve the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge. For example, Enoch (2003) argues that anyone who has reason
to believe (2) also has reason to believe the conditional: If lying is wrong, I disapprove of lying, and anyone
who has reason to believe (3) also has reason to believe: I disapprove of lying. According to Enoch, these
alternative descriptive premises are what justies the agent in believing (4). Note that this proposal makes
no headway on the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge; it doesn’t explain why the state of believing (3) is
itself epistemically evaluable, whereas other desires are not.
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3 Are Some Desires Epistemically Evaluable?
One line of response is to insist that some desires are epistemically evaluable. There are a
few dierent ways one might try to motivate this position. One way is to point out that
some desires are based on beliefs, which are in turn epistemically evaluable. Perhaps,
some may suggest, a desire can inherit the epistemic status of a belief on which it is
based. For example, suppose I desire to drink pond sludge, but only because I irrationally
believe that drinking pond sludge will make me a better philosopher. Perhaps my desire
for a pond potation is epistemically—and not just practically—irrational.
However, there are two diculties with this response. First, even if desires can in-
herit some of the epistemic statuses of the beliefs on which they are based, it doesn’t
seem they can inherit all of these statuses. Suppose I know I will enjoy a particular play.
As a result, I form a desire to see it. Even if we grant that this desire is epistemically
rational, it seems odd to describe the desire as knowledge. And so a restricted version of
EEQ remains:
Why can beliefs (both moral and prosaic) qualify as knowledge, whereas desires can-
not?
As with EEQ, it is tempting to answer this question by appealing to some dierence
in the functional role of beliefs and desires. But, as before, any such answer stands in
tension with noncognitivism.
Even if we set aside the issue of knowledge, a further diculty remains. According to
the response under consideration, desires are at best derivatively epistemically evaluable:
whenever a desire has some epistemic status, it derives this status from a belief on which
it is based. However, beliefs are importantly dierent. Take any foundational prosaic
belief, for example, It appears to me that such-and-such. This belief can be epistemically
rational, even though it does not inherit this status from any other beliefs. The same goes
for foundational moral beliefs. My belief that pain is bad can be epistemically rational,
even though it does not seem to derive this status from other beliefs.
This dierence gives rise to another variant of EEQ:
Why can beliefs (both moral and prosaic) be non-derivatively epistemically rational,
whereas desires cannot?
Once again, noncognitivists will have to give an answer that does not depend on func-
tional role.21
21Some might insist that moral beliefs are only derivatively epistemically rational, and that even my belief
that pain is bad derives its epistemic status from some prosaic belief of the form, Pain has properties P1 . . .
Pn. But this just pushes us back a step: what prosaic belief serves as the basis for my belief, Anything with
properties P1 . . . Pn is bad? Alternatively, some might concede that the most basic moral beliefs have their
epistemic statuses by default: my belief that pain is bad is epistemically rational simply in virtue of being
foundational. But then why wouldn’t the same hold for basic desires—say, the desire to avoid pain?
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Another way of motivating the idea that some desires are epistemically evaluable is
to point out that noncognitivists already face the ‘Moral Attitude Problem.’ This prob-
lem stems from the fact that not every desire constitutes a moral belief, even by the
noncognitivist’s lights. After all, I might desire to slake my thirst without thinking that
thirst-slaking is morally good. Thus noncognitivists owe us some story about what dis-
tinguishes the ‘moral attitude’ from ordinary, non-moral desires.22 One might hope that
a solution to this problem will also yield an answer to the Epistemic Evaluability Chal-
lenge: perhaps once we know what distinguishes the moral attitude, we’ll also know
why this attitude is epistemically evaluable.
However, this response also faces two diculties.23 The rst concerns its plausibility.
On the face of it, the question, What makes an attitude qualify as moral? seems very
dierent from the question, What makes an attitude epistemically evaluable? After all,
morality is one thing, epistemology is another. Thus noncognitivists who opt for this
response need to provide some reason for thinking the two questions are connected.
If we turn to look at some of the leading solutions to the Moral Attitude Problem, we
nd scant grounds for optimism. Consider for example, the ‘emotional ascent’ solution
advocated by Blackburn (1998). Simplifying somewhat, Blackburn proposes that a desire
counts as moral as long as it’s accompanied by a higher-order desire for other people to
share it. For example, my desire that no one steals constitutes a moral desire because I
also desire that others share this desire. This proposal has the advantage of explaining
why we care whether others share the moral attitude. And perhaps it thereby explains
why we make claims about the conditions under which the moral attitude is warranted or
unwarranted. But what explains why we make claims about whether the moral attitude
is epistemically warranted, rather than practically warranted? Why would meeting this
higher-order desire condition suce to make a desire epistemically rational or irrational,
let alone a candidate for knowledge?
A second diculty comes from parsimony considerations. Even if being a moral at-
titude is sucient for epistemic evaluability, it is clearly not necessary. After all, prosaic
beliefs are epistemically evaluable. What explains this? If noncognitivists allow that
prosaic beliefs are epistemically evaluable in virtue of some features of their functional
role, they will be saddled with a disjunctive answer to EEQ. Specically, they will be
committed to saying that prosaic beliefs are epistemically evaluable in virtue of some
features of their functional role, but moral beliefs are epistemically evaluable in virtue
of meeting some other condition—namely, whatever condition makes a desire qualify as
distinctively moral. By contrast, cognitivists have a more parsimonious answer to EEQ:
22The label, ‘Moral Attitude Problem’ is due to Miller (2003), who raises diculties for a number of
proposed solutions. For discussion of how noncognitivists might solve the problem, see Kauppinen 2010;
Köhler 2013; Björnsson and McPherson 2014.
23A caveat: I am here focusing on noncognitivists who think the moral attitude is a specic type of desire.
My criticisms do not apply to those who want to solve the Moral Attitude Problem by taking the moral
attitude to have a more complicated functional role—one that diers from the D-Role in certain respects. I
discuss such proposals in §5.
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they’ll say that all beliefs—moral and prosaic—are epistemically evaluable in virtue of
some features of their functional role.
A third and nal way of motivating the claim that some desires are epistemically
evaluable is worth discussing. Perhaps, some may suggest, certain desires are epistemi-
cally evaluable, but not qua desires. Rather, we need to conceive of them under the ‘guise
of belief’ in order for them to be epistemically evaluable. According to this proposal, a
state’s epistemic evaluability (or lack thereof) is relative to our mode of describing the
state. Call it a desire, and one cannot properly ascribe it any epistemic status. Call it a
belief, and suddenly one can.24
This is an intriguing option; in my view, it is the most promising way of motivating
the idea that desires are sometimes epistemically evaluable. That said, I think it faces a
signicant obstacle. Proponents of this ‘guise of belief’ response will need to maintain
that epistemic evaluations create opaque contexts, and it is questionable whether this
claim can be independently motivated. To see why they need to make this claim, consider
the following argument:
(5) Jane’s belief (that stealing is wrong) is epistemically justied.
(6) Jane’s desire (that no one steals) is not epistemically justied.
(7) Jane’s belief 6= Jane’s desire.
In order to resist the conclusion, proponents of the ‘guise of belief’ response will
need to say that one of the constituent expressions—‘Jane’s belief’, ‘Jane’s desire’, ‘epis-
temically justied’—shifts its extension in the course of the argument. But it is one thing
to say this, and another thing to motivate it. Is there independent reason to posit this
sort of semantic shift?
To appreciate the diculty, consider an analogous argument that often crops up in
debates over whether constitution is identity:
(8) The statue is necessarily a statue.
(9) The clay is not necessarily a statue.
(10) The statue 6= the clay.
While many nd this argument persuasive, those who hold that constitution is iden-
tity cry foul; they insist that one of the premises creates an opaque context, and hence
the conclusion does not follow.25 Regardless of whether we nd this response persua-
sive,we should at least admit that its semantic premise is on comparatively rm ground.
After all, it is independently plausible that modal terms create opaque contexts. Take an
astronomically updated version of Quine’s (1961) famous example: eight is necessarily
greater than seven; the number of planets is not necessarily greater than seven; but from
this we cannot conclude that there are not eight planets. This is precisely the sort of
24Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this response.
25See e.g., Gibbard 1975. For criticisms of this response, see e.g., Baker 1997.
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independent motivation that proponents of the ‘guise of belief’ response need, but seem
to lack.
None of this is intended to be a decisive refutation of the ‘guise of belief’ response.
My point is simply that proponents of this response incur substantive and controversial
semantic commitments. If—as I’ll be arguing in §7—there is a way of solving the Epis-
temic Evaluability Challenge that avoids these commitments, then this provides a reason
to favor such an alternative.
4 Noncognitivism Extended
Another response to the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is to switch tack and ask,
‘What’s involved in epistemically evaluating a psychological state in the rst place?’
Epistemic evaluations resemble moral evaluations in some important respects. In
particular, both are normative: calling a belief ‘irrational’ is a form of criticism; calling
a belief ‘rational’ is a form of praise. This has led some moral noncognitivists to em-
brace epistemic noncognitivism. According to epistemic noncognitivism, epistemically
evaluating a psychological state s involves adopting a particular desire-like attitude—an
‘epistemic attitude’—towards s.26 To illustrate, suppose Susie believes that global warm-
ing has human causes, and Fred deems this belief epistemically rational. On a simple
version of epistemic noncognitivism, for Fred to believe that Susie’s belief is rational is
for Fred to approve—perhaps in some distinctly epistemic way—of Susie’s belief. Given
the assumption that epistemic rationality is a necessary condition on knowledge, this
entails that knowledge attributions also have a noncognitive element: part of what it is
for Fred to believe that Susie knows that global warming has human causes is for Fred to
adopt some epistemic attitude towards her belief.
Epistemic noncognitivism is controversial, but let us suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that some version of it proves viable. For epistemic noncognitivists, answering
EEQ will amount to answering what I’ll call the ‘Epistemic Attitude Question’ (EAQ):
EAQ Why do we adopt epistemic attitudes towards beliefs, but not towards desires?
However, it’s doubtful that EAQ is any more tractable than EEQ. In order to answer
EAQ, noncognitivists will still need to identify some features that moral and prosaic
beliefs possess, and that prototypical desires lack—features that explain why we adopt
epistemic attitudes towards the former but not the latter. But what are these features, if
not aspects of the functional role of moral and prosaic beliefs?
Perhaps, some may suggest, this just shows that we should take our noncognitivism
a step further. In addition to being noncognitivists about epistemic evaluations, per-
haps we should also be noncognitivists about belief ascriptions: perhaps regarding some
26For sympathetic discussions of epistemic noncognitivism, see Gibbard 2003; Ridge 2007a; Field 2009,
2018; Kappel 2010; Chrisman 2007; Carter and Chrisman 2012; Grajner 2015; Beddor 2016: chp.2, among
others.
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psychological state s as a ‘belief’ involves adopting a conative attitude towards s. For
example, one might hold that part of what it is to regard s as a ‘belief’ is to be willing
to adopt epistemic attitudes towards s. At rst blush, such a view appears to oer an
easy way out of the challenge. If regarding a state as a ‘belief’ requires being willing to
epistemically evaluate it, then there is no great mystery as to why beliefs—both moral
and prosaic—are epistemically evaluable.
But does this move really help? We still don’t have an answer to EAQ: we still don’t
have a story about why we’re willing to adopt epistemic attitudes towards some states
and not others. Presumably, this isn’t a matter of whim or convention. (If it were, we
would expect to nd communities that adopt the epistemic attitudes towards all sorts
of psychological states: desires for thirst-quenching, headaches, you name it.) And so
noncognitivists about belief attributions still need to identify some further features of
the psychological states we call ‘beliefs’, features that explain why we’re willing to adopt
the epistemic attitudes towards them in the rst place. Again, it is unclear what those
features could be, if not some aspects of their functional role.27
5 Enriching the Boxology
Another response to the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge is to insist on a richer box-
ology. Our cognitive architecture involves more than two boxes: mental states such as
plans, intentions, and preferences have functional roles that resemble the D-Role in some
respects, but dier from the D-Role in others. And some noncognitivists have been care-
ful to identify moral beliefs with these desire-like states. For example, Gibbard (2003,
2013) takes moral belief to be a type of plan; Dreier (2006, 2009) and Silk (2015) take
moral belief to be a type of preference. Perhaps noncognitivists who go this route can
retain the Functional Role Hypothesis: perhaps they can use the functional dierences
between moral beliefs and desires to explain why the former are epistemically evaluable
in ways the latter are not.
5.1 Preferences and Plans
But can we nd any desire-like states that are epistemically evaluable in the same ways as
beliefs? Suppose that Jane prefers attending a party to staying home. Suppose that Jane
also plans to attend the party. Would we be willing to describe either her preference
or her plan as epistemically rational? Perhaps we would if both are based on a belief
27This is not to say that a state’s functional role completely determines whether we classify it as a belief.
For example, one might adopt the view defended in Shah and Velleman 2005, according to which there are
a variety of attitudes of acceptance, all of which have similar functional roles. Shah and Velleman maintain
that treating one of these attitudes as a ‘belief’ involves adopting a conative attitude towards it. Note that on
this view the functional role of a state does not fully determine whether it is classied as a belief. However,
it does impose signicant constraints, precluding certain states (in particular, conative attitudes) from being
the kind of things that we could properly regard as beliefs.
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that possesses this epistemic status—for example, a belief that her friends will attend the
party. But this at best gets us derivative epistemic rationality. Moreover, it seems odd to
describe either the preference or the plan as knowledge, even derivatively.
Thus neither preferences nor plans are epistemically evaluable in the same ways
as moral beliefs. This is instructive, since one motivation for identifying moral beliefs
with such states is that they display some of the hallmarks of prosaic beliefs. For exam-
ple, Dreier’s reason for thinking that noncognitivists should identify moral beliefs with
preferences is that preferences are subject to coherence constraints: in this regard they
resemble prosaic beliefs and dier from desires. According to Dreier, if I prefer to take
a trip and also prefer to stay home, my preferences are incoherent; if I desire to take a
trip and also desire to stay home, my desires are only conicted (2009: 105-106). Simi-
larly, one of Gibbard’s reasons for identifying moral beliefs with plans is that plans, like
prosaic beliefs, stand in agreement and disagreement relations. To illustrate with one
of Gibbard’s examples, suppose Caesar plans to go to the Senate. Suppose Brutus has a
conicting ‘contingency plan’: his plan, conditional on being in Caesar’s situation, is to
stay home. According to Gibbard, Caesar and Brutus disagree in plan (2003: 68-69).
It is not entirely clear to me that desires dier from preferences and plans in these
respects. But let us grant, at least for the sake of argument, that they do: let us grant that
preferences can be evaluated for coherence/incoherence, and that plans can be evaluated
for agreement/disagreement. What my discussion shows is that whatever functional
features render a state evaluable in these ways do not thereby render it epistemically
evaluable.
5.2 Beyond Folk Psychology
Suppose noncognitivists concede that it was a mistake to identify moral beliefs with
preferences or plans. ‘Still,’ they may insist, ‘this doesn’t show that there couldn’t be
a desire-like state with a slightly dierent functional role—call it the “D*-Role”—that
renders this state epistemically evaluable in the same ways as prosaic beliefs. Admittedly,
it is dicult to nd any clear examples of such states in our folk psychological inventory.
But so what? There are more states than are dreamt of in folk psychology.’
One worry about this response is that we risk losing our grip on noncognitivism.
Long before taking our rst metaethics class, we had a pre-theoretical understanding of
various conative attitudes (desire, preference, and the like), an understanding that came
with our mastery of folk psychology. Then we started doing metaethics and met the
noncognitivist, who identied moral beliefs with these conative attitudes. Regardless of
whether we agreed with this proposal, we at least understood it. But now the noncog-
nitivist has changed her tune. Now moral belief is claimed to be an unfamiliar attitude,
unknown to folk psychology. This raises the worry that we lack any clear understanding
of the attitude in question.
In order to address this concern, noncognitivists who look beyond folk psychology
owe us an account of the states they posit. They need to give us some sense of how the
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D*-Role diers from the D-Role, and why this dierence makes an epistemic dierence.
Without such an account, noncognitivists have traded boxology for black box-ology.28
Providing such an account is easier said than done. The natural temptation is to look
to the B-Role for guidance: to nd some feature of the B-Role that plausibly underpins
epistemic evaluability, and insist that part of what it is for a mental state to play the
D*-Role is for it to possess this feature. But this strategy comes with a risk. The more
that the functional role of moral belief resembles the functional role of prosaic belief,
the harder it is to maintain that the functional role of moral belief resembles the D-Role
much more closely than it does the B-Role.
Thus noncognitivists who pursue this strategy must walk a ne line. On the one
hand, they must make the functional role of moral belief close enough to the B-Role to
secure epistemic evaluability. On the other hand, they must make the functional role
of moral belief distant enough from the B-Role to preserve their noncognitivist bona
des. In the rest of this section, I consider what strikes me as the most promising way of
treading this tightrope.
5.3 Evidence Responsiveness
Prototypical beliefs are responsive to evidence. Suppose I initially believe my car is in the
shop, but I later gain compelling evidence that it isn’t there. I’ll be disposed to revise my
belief. Some have suggested that this evidence responsiveness is part of the functional
role of belief:
Ceteris paribus, gaining suciently strong evidence for (against) p disposes one to be-
lieve (cease believing) p.29
Arguably, evidence responsiveness is a feature of moral beliefs as well as prosaic
beliefs. Suppose Jane initially believes that the US should impose sanctions on a partic-
ular country, but later receives evidence that the US shouldn’t do so. If Alex accepts this
evidence, we would expect her to be at least somewhat disposed to revise her belief.
By contrast, prototypical desires and preferences don’t seem to be evidence respon-
sive (Smith 1987). Of course, they are reasons responsive: gaining a suciently strong
practical reason not to attend a performance (e.g., reading a bad review) will lead me
28Recently, Gibbard has acknowledged that his notion of a plan diers in certain ways from our ordinary
concept of a plan (2013: chp.8). However, none of the dierences that Gibbard mentions seem to make for an
epistemic dierence. For example, Gibbardian plans, unlike ordinary plans, apply to hypothetical situations
in which we will never nd ourselves (e.g., being in Caesar’s sandals, contemplating whether to go to the
Senate). This dierence in the scope of the plans doesn’t seem epistemically relevant. From the epistemic
point of view, a Gibbardian plan to go to the Senate, if in Caesar’s position, seems on a par with an ordinary
plan to stop at the store: both are at best derivatively epistemically evaluable.
29For sympathetic discussion of the idea that evidence responsiveness is partially constitutive of belief,
see Adler 2002; Velleman 2000; Shah and Velleman 2005. For dissent, see Bayne and Pacherie 2005.
16
noncognitivism and epistemic evaluations
to abandon my desire to attend. But gaining evidence that I will not attend the perfor-
mance will not have the same eect. Indeed, learning that tickets are extremely scarce
(and hence that I am unlikely to secure one) may increase my desire to attend.
Are intentions and plans evidence responsive? This is less clear. According to what’s
sometimes called the ‘Strong Belief Thesis’, intending to φ entails believing one will φ.
If this is right, then gaining strong evidence that I won’t see the play will dispose me to
cease intending to see it. However, the Strong Belief Thesis is controversial.30 And even
if it’s correct, intentions will be at most derivatively evidence responsive: they’ll only be
evidence responsive because they entail some further evidence responsive state (belief).
Perhaps, then, evidence responsiveness (or non-derivative evidence responsiveness)
gives us what we want. Arguably, it’s part of the functional role of both moral and prosaic
belief. Moreover, it’s the sort of feature that might be thought to suce for epistemic
evaluability. At the same time, evidence responsiveness doesn’t seem to be sucient
for belief. And so noncognitivists could maintain that while moral beliefs are evidence
responsive, they play a desire-like role in practical reasoning. Hence they dier from
prosaic beliefs in their output conditions.
While this all seems promising, a serious hurdle remains. According to the present
proposal, evidence responsiveness is part of the functional role of moral beliefs. But a
state is evidence responsive just in case it is responsive to evidence for its content. In the
case of moral belief, this will be a moral content. This raises a worry: if noncognitivists
stop here, they will be helping themselves to the notion of a moral content, which runs
contrary to the explanatory ambitions of noncognitivism. After all, one of the main
goals of noncognitivism is to explain the contents of moral thought in purely naturalistic
terms—to locate ‘ought’s within the world of ‘is’s.31
To overcome this hurdle, advocates of the evidence responsiveness strategy will need
to develop some independent account of what it is to have evidence for or against a
moral content—an account that, on pain of circularity, does not itself rely on the notion
of moral belief. Can this be done? Perhaps. But we should not underestimate the di-
culties. To begin with, note that while noncognitivists have developed accounts of moral
knowledge (§2.2) and epistemic evaluations more generally (§4), none have—at least to
my knowledge—provided what’s needed here, which is an account of how evidence can
bear on some moral content. Moreover, when we consider how noncognitivists might
ll in the details, we nd that some initially attractive routes lead to dead ends.
For example, one natural strategy would be to proceed as follows. Start with your
preferred account of evidence. Next, analyze claims about ‘evidential support’ as claims
about what credences an agent should adopt, given some body of evidence. For example,
‘Evidence e counts in favor of p’ could be paraphrased as ‘Someone who gains e should
raise their degree of belief in p.’ We could go on to give this ‘should’ an expressivist gloss,
analyzing such claims as expressions of an epistemic pro-attitude towards someone rais-
30For discussion, see Bratman 1987; Ross 2009.
31See Blackburn 1998 and Gibbard 1990, 2003 for clear statements of the naturalistic agenda.
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ing their degree of belief in p upon gaining e. While this analysis is promising, it won’t
give proponents of the evidence responsiveness strategy what they need. After all, this
analysis relies on the notion of degrees of belief. When p is moral, this will be a degree
of belief in a moral content. And so the account relies on the very sort of psychological
relation towards a moral content that we sought to explain.32
Let’s take stock. While it’s natural to try to resolve the Epistemic Evaluability Chal-
lenge by insisting on a richer functional role for moral beliefs, this response runs into a
number of hurdles. It won’t help to model moral beliefs on preferences or plans, since
these states are not epistemically evaluable in the same ways as moral beliefs. And if
noncognitivists choose to identify moral beliefs with some other state, they owe us an
account of this state’s functional role—an account that explains why this state is epistem-
ically evaluable. Providing such an account is not easy. One natural strategy—appealing
to evidence responsiveness—led the noncognitivist to incur further explanatory commit-
ments. It remains to be seen whether these commitments can be discharged and, if not,
whether some alternative strategy fares better.
6 Hybrid Approaches
Thus far, we have focused on ‘pure’ noncognitivist views, according to which having
a moral belief is just a matter of having some conative attitude. Recently, a number
of authors have proposed hybrid views that integrate cognitivist and noncognitivist el-
ements. According to hybrid theorists, having a moral belief involves having both a
conative attitude and a prosaic belief.33 For example, a simple hybrid view might hold
that believing torture is wrong involves being in two states: (i) a prosaic belief that tor-
ture has some natural property F (say, causing suering), (ii) a desire to avoid actions
that have F. If noncognitivists are willing to go hybrid, can they escape the Epistemic
Evaluability Challenge?
At rst blush, the answer appears to be ‘Yes.’ After all, hybrid theorists can adopt a
version of the Functional Role Hypothesis: they can insist that a state is epistemically
32A dierent strategy would be to suggest that a moral belief can be evidence responsive without being
responsive to evidence for/against its content. All that’s required is for it to be responsive to evidence
for/against some prosaic belief on which the moral belief is partially based. For example: Jane believes that
eating meat at a certain restaurant is morally permissible, but only because she believes the restaurant uses
humanely treated animals. Were she to gain evidence against the prosaic belief, she would revise her moral
belief. But this sort of evidence responsiveness is also exhibited by run-of-the-mill plans and preferences.
For example, I plan to go to the store, but only because I believe it will be open. Were I to gain evidence the
store is closed, I would revise my plan. And so this indirect evidence responsiveness won’t give us what
we need, which is a special sort of evidence responsiveness that distinguishes moral beliefs from ordinary
plans/preferences, in virtue of which the former but not the latter are epistemically evaluable.
33For discussion of hybrid views, see Ridge 2006b, 2007b, 2014; Boisvert 2008; Schroeder 2009; Fletcher
and Ridge 2014; Laskowski 2019. As Schroeder (2013) observes, a hybrid view can be thought of as a special
case of a ‘relational’ view, according to which one has a moral belief if and only if a particular relation
between prosaic beliefs and desire-like states obtains. (For an example of a non-hybrid relational view, see
Toppinen 2013.) While I focus on hybrid views, everything I say applies to relational views in general.
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evaluable as long as it plays the B-Role, or is partially composed of a state that plays the B-
Role. Moral beliefs are epistemically evaluable, since they contain a prosaic component.
Desires are not epistemically evaluable, since they contain no such component.
Alas, things are not so simple. Consider: how exactly does the prosaic component
render the moral belief epistemically evaluable? The simplest answer would be that the
moral belief inherits the epistemic status of its prosaic component. But if we consider
the details of standard hybrid views, we see that this can’t be right. Suppose that vicious
Vic values suering. According to the simple hybrid view, Vic’s belief that torture is
good consists in (i) a prosaic belief that torture causes suering, (ii) a desire to perform
actions that cause suering. Now, suppose Vic’s prosaic belief (that torture causes suf-
fering) is in perfectly good epistemic standing: it is rational and justied; it qualies as
knowledge. Still, we presumably do not want to accord his belief that torture is good the
same epistemic standing. Most obviously, we would be loath to call it knowledge (since
knowledge is factive); we would also be reluctant to deem it rational or justied.34
What this shows is that the epistemic status of a moral belief is not simply inherited
from its prosaic component. Instead, it is somehow aected by the conative component.
Hybrid theorists owe us an account of how this works: how exactly does Vic’s desire
preclude the moral belief from qualifying as knowledge, or as epistemically rational?
More generally, how does a desire which is not itself epistemically evaluable aect the
epistemic status of a composite belief? These questions are far from trivial, and it is by no
means obvious how to provide satisfactory answers. Until such answers are forthcoming,
hybrid theorists cannot claim to have fully resolved our challenge.35
7 Grounding Noncognitivism
We have explored a number of initially attractive options for resolving the Epistemic
Evaluability Challenge, only to run into further obstacles. Perhaps, then, it is time to
go back to the beginning and reconsider our initial construal of ‘pure’ noncognitivism.
In this section, I suggest construing noncognitivism as a thesis about the grounding re-
lations between desires and beliefs. While this version of noncognitivism has not been
34This problem is not an artifact of the simple hybrid view I’ve chosen for the sake of illustration; it also
aects other hybrid views. Take, for example, the view in Ridge 2006b. On this view, believing that x is
good involves both (i) a prosaic belief that some advisor would approve of x, (ii) approval of the advisor
mentioned in (i). Suppose Vic’s belief that some advisor would approve of torture has impeccable epistemic
credentials. Still, it seems that Vic’s belief that torture is good is epistemically defective.
35To be clear on the diculty facing hybrid theorists: I am not claiming that there is anything wrong
with holding that states which are not epistemically evaluable inuence the epistemic status of other states.
After all, experiences seem to work this way; my perceptual experience of a sunset is not epistemically
evaluable, but it can aect the epistemic status of my belief that I’m seeing a sunset. The diculty is rather
in providing a general explanation of how desires wield their epistemic inuence. In the case of experiences,
there is arguably a simple story to be told. Any experience with content p makes it prima facie rational to
believe p (Pryor 2000). Clearly no story along these lines will work in the case of desire. Desiring p certainly
does not makes it rational to believe p—otherwise wishful thinking would be rational!
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discussed in the literature, I argue that it has signicant advantages. In particular, it is
fully consistent with the Functional Role Hypothesis. As a result, it oers a promising
way to resolve our challenge.
7.1 Introducing Grounding Noncognitivism
We began by construing pure noncognitivism as a disjunctive view of belief. To have
a belief is to either be in a state that plays the B-Role or to be in a state that plays the
D-Role. Thus understood, noncognitivism amounts to a ‘Two Box’ conception of belief.
It says there are two kinds of belief, prosaic and moral, each with its own functional
role. While this is a natural construal, it is not the only option. Here is an alternative.
Suppose we agree with the cognitivist that there is only one belief box: prosaic and
moral beliefs have the same functional role. Where we part ways with the cognitivist
is in our conception of the relation between the B-Role and the D-Role. In particular,
we advance the following thesis: whenever an agent has a moral belief, this is grounded
in the fact that they have certain desire-like attitudes. For example, whenever an agent
believes that stealing is wrong, this fact is grounded in the further fact that they have
some distinctly moral species of disapproval towards stealing. Call this view, ‘Grounding
Noncognitivism.’ (See Fig. 2.)
Beliefs
Moral Beliefs Moral Attitudes
Desires
Action
Practical Reasoning
Figure 2: Grounding Noncognitivism. Solid lines represent causal dependence; dashed
lines represent metaphysical dependence.
Grounding noncognitivism is an unfamiliar view; a few words of clarication may
help bring it in clearer perspective. First, what notion of ‘grounding’ is at issue? Here
I am drawing on the metaphysics literature, which takes grounding to be a non-causal
dependence relation, of the sort that is often conveyed by the expressions, ‘because’
and ‘in virtue of.’ By way of illustration, consider the following claims: (i) the vase is
fragile in virtue of its categorical properties; (ii) Jones is in pain because his nocioceptors
are ring, (iii) the set {Socrates} exists in virtue of the fact that Socrates exists. Each of
these claims postulates a non-causal dependence relation between one fact and another.
‘Grounding’ is a term of art used to denote this relation.36
36For seminal work on grounding, see Fine (2001, 2012); Schaer (2009); Rosen (2010). As these authors
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By now, much ink has been spilled on the grounding relation. I will set subtle ques-
tions about the nature of grounding aside, since they are largely orthogonal to my pur-
poses. What I mainly need is a fairly minimal assumption: the grounding relation is dis-
tinct from the identity relation. This seems plausible in light of the preceding examples:
dispositional properties are not identical to their categorical bases; Socrates’ singleton
set is not identical to Socrates.37 Given this assumption, we are in a position to see how
grounding noncognitivism diers from the more familiar view, embraced by ‘Two Box’
noncognitivism, that moral beliefs are identical to conative states. Both views agree that
there is an intimate modal connection between moral belief and desire, specically:
Modal Connection Necessarily, S has a moral belief if and only if S is in a certain
conative state (specically, the moral attitude).38
But they dier on the exact relation between the moral belief and the desire. For the
grounding noncognitivist, the relation between the belief and the desire is the same as
the relation between {Socrates} and Socrates—one of dependence rather than identity.
How does grounding noncognitivism help with the Epistemic Evaluability Chal-
lenge? The answer is that grounding noncognitivists can embrace the Functional Role
Hypothesis without revisions or reservations. After all, grounding noncognitivists main-
tain that prosaic and moral beliefs have the same functional role. And so grounding
noncognitivists can happily allow that this role suces to make a state epistemically
evaluable. Similarly, grounding noncognitivists will maintain that desires have an im-
portantly dierent functional role—a role that deprives them of epistemic evaluability. To
illustrate, suppose that Jane has a distinctively moral desire for people to give to charity.
According to grounding noncognitivists, this desire is not epistemically evaluable, since
it lacks the epistemic evaluability-conferring features of the B-Role. However, the fact
that Jane has this desire grounds the fact that she has a certain moral belief—specically,
the belief that giving to charity is good. And this belief is epistemically evaluable, in
virtue of its functional role.
Some might nd this rather mysterious. If the desire-like attitude grounds the moral
belief, how can the belief possess a property—e.g., the property of being knowledge—
that the desire lacks? But the literature on grounding aords plenty of cases where the
existence of x grounds the existence of y, yet y possesses properties that x lacks. Take
our earlier example: the fact that Jones is in a certain brain state grounds the fact that
Jones is in pain, but the pain has the property of being mental, whereas the brain state
note, while the term ‘grounding’ is recent, the notion is old. We nd it at work as far back as the Euthyphro,
when Socrates asks whether something is pious because it is loved by the gods.
37Indeed, many hold that grounding is an asymmetric, hence irreexive, relation. The main motivation
for this is that grounding is an explanatory relation, and explanation seems to be asymmetric (Cameron
2008; Schaer 2009; Rosen 2010).
38At least, the grounding noncognitivist agrees on this point given the plausible assumption that ground-
ing is a species of metaphysical entailment: if A fully grounds B at a world w, then in any world v where A
obtains, B obtains. For defense of this assumption, see Fine 2012; Trogdon 2013.
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does not. Or take the example of Socrates and his singleton set. Socrates’ existence
grounds the existence of his singleton set, but his singleton set has the property of being
a set, whereas Socrates does not.
Grounding noncognitivism thus oers a promising way of escaping the Epistemic
Evaluability Challenge. That said, the view gives rise to dicult questions. In what fol-
lows, I canvass some of the most pressing. §7.2 tackles an explanatory question: how
do desire-like states manage to ground moral beliefs? §7.3 explores whether grounding
noncognitivism merits the noncognitivist title: how does grounding noncognitivism dif-
fer from sophisticated versions of subjectivism, such as Dreier’s (1990) view? Finally,
§7.4 considers whether grounding noncognitivism can explain why only some desire-
like states ground beliefs.
7.2 How Do Desire-Like States Ground Moral Beliefs?
As it stands, grounding noncognitivism may appear to have all the advantages of ex-
planatory theft over toil. How exactly does possession of a conative state manage to
ground possession of a moral belief?
Some might resist this demand for explanation. It is not clear whether all ground-
ing relations can be explained; perhaps some grounding facts are brute. However, this
response does little to satisfy the craving for a more genuinely explanatory account.
Moreover, it is a risky strategy dialectically. After all, noncognitivists often appeal to the
Humean theory of motivation. And people are usually attracted to the Humean theory
because they want to avoid positing brute necessary connections between beliefs and
desires. But surely positing brute grounding connections is no better, especially since
the grounding connections entail necessary connections!
It is thus incumbent on grounding noncognitivists to provide some further explana-
tion here. In what follows, I’ll sketch one way of delivering the goods. My explanation
proceeds in two parts. The rst part is semantic: I sketch an expressivist account of moral
contents. The second part is psychological: I develop a general account of the functional
roles of belief and desire, from which a noncognitivist treatment of the functional role
of moral belief emerges as a special case. Combining these two parts delivers an expla-
nation of why moral beliefs necessarily depend on conative states—an explanation that
preserves a unitary functional role for all belief, moral and prosaic. Note that this two-
part explanation is only intended as a ‘proof of concept’: I aim to sketch one possible
way of developing grounding noncognitivism into a genuinely explanatory theory.
7.2.1 The Semantic Stage: Contents for Expressivists
Developing the rst stage of my explanation requires shifting from moral psychology to
moral semantics. The natural semantic ally for a noncognitivist psychology is expres-
sivism. According to expressivism, the function of a moral utterance is not to represent
the world, but rather to express the speaker’s conative attitudes.
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By now, a variety of sophisticated implementations of this central expressivist idea
have been developed. For present purposes, I will focus on one implementation, due to
Gibbard (1990, 2003). I choose Gibbard’s strategy because it is one of the most prominent
and promising expressivist semantics to date. However, I should stress at the outset that
nothing crucial hinges on this choice of implementation.
In order to introduce Gibbard’s framework, it is useful to start with a possible worlds
semantics. Begin by assuming that prosaic claims represent the world as being a certain
way, and hence can be modeled with a set of possible worlds. For example, ‘Grass is
green’ represents the world as being one where grass is green; hence it can be modeled
with the set of worlds in which grass is green. Since moral utterances do not represent
the world as being a certain way, their contents cannot be modeled by sets of worlds.
Nonetheless, we can still model their contents using a conservative extension of a pos-
sible worlds semantics. In particular, we can take the content of a moral utterance to be
a set of ordered pairs whose rst member is a world and whose second member is some
formal entity that represents the moral attitude. Dierent versions of this approach are
possible, depending on what one takes the moral attitude to be. Gibbard (1990) uses a
norm (representing the content of a state of norm acceptance); Gibbard (2003) and Yalcin
(2012) use a hyperplan (representing the content of a planning state). In order to remain
as neutral as possible concerning the nature of the moral attitude, I will take the entity
to be a moral perspective, where a moral perspective is a representation of any actual
or hypothetical moral attitude.39 Nothing substantive will be assumed about the moral
attitude, only that it is a conative state, and that it can be used to rank various actions
and outcomes.
To illustrate this approach, take a moral utterance such as:
(11) Charitable giving is good.
The content of this utterance will be a set of world, moral perspective pairs—specically,
the set of w,m pairs where m assigns high marks to charitable giving at w. For ease of
reference, let us call this set ‘good’:
good = {〈w,m〉 | m highly ranks charitable giving at w}.
Two advantages of Gibbard’s framework are worth highlighting. First, it enables
expressivists to mimic the standard possible worlds semantics for negation, disjunction,
conjunction, and so on. As in possible worlds semantics, these operations are analyzed in
terms of set theoretic operations—complementation, union, and intersection. The only
dierence is that these operations are now dened over sets of world, moral perspective
pairs. Second, the Gibbardian framework allows us to assign the same sort of content
to both moral and prosaic sentences. To see this, note that for any set of worlds Γ we
39Cf. the notion of a ‘normative perspective’ in Ridge 2014: 113-121.
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can dene a ‘boring’ set of world, moral perspective pairs that is equivalent to Γ.40 Thus
rather than taking the semantic content of ‘Grass is green’ to be the set of worlds in
which grass is green, we can take it to be the set of world, moral perspective pairs in
which grass is green. As a result, Gibbard’s framework extends naturally to sentences
that ‘mix’ moral and non-moral content—e.g., ‘Grass is green and charitable giving is
good.’ Taken together, these features make the Gibbardian framework one of the most
promising strategies for handling the Frege-Geach problem.
Equipped with an expressivist account of content, we can extract expressivist truth
conditions. Of course, old-school noncognitivists shunned all talk of moral truth. But
just as most contemporary noncognitivists want to preserve our everyday attributions of
moral belief, most want to preserve our everyday attributions of moral truth—assuming
these attributions can be analyzed in a way that is compatible with antirealism.41
Here’s a natural way of getting the desired analysis out of our Gibbardian contents.
On a standard intensional semantics in the tradition of Kaplan (1989), contents have
truth-values relative to a circumstance of evaluation. (Think of a circumstance of evalu-
ation as a tuple of whatever features need to be settled in order for a content to sensi-
bly be described as true or false.) Expressivists can help themselves to this framework
provided they take circumstances of evaluation to include not just a world, but also a
moral perspective. They can then adopt a standard denition of truth at a circumstance
of evaluation: a content p is true at a circumstance of evaluation 〈w,m〉 if and only if
〈w,m〉 ∈ p. To illustrate, this approach yields the following truth conditions for (11):
Expressivist Truth Conditions ‘Charitable giving is good’ is true at 〈w,m〉 if and
only if 〈w,m〉 ∈ good, which obtains if and only if m highly ranks charitable
giving at w.
Some may worry that even if expressivists are willing to talk about moral truth,
the notion of moral truth conditions is anathema to expressivism. However, I think
that there is no need for expressivists to renounce truth conditional semantics alto-
gether. Rather they should distinguish between representational truth conditions and
non-representational truth conditions. Representational truth conditions place conditions
on the world and the world alone: if a sentence has representational truth conditions,
then in order to settle its truth-value all one needs to do is settle what the world is
like.42 Our expressivist truth conditions are non-representational. To nd out whether
the content of (11) is true, it’s not enough to settle on a world. One also needs to settle
on a moral perspective. By distinguishing between representational truth conditions and
non-representational truth conditions, we can reap the advantages of truth conditional
40More precisely, say a set of world, moral perspective pairs p is boring just in case for any moral per-
spectives m1,m2 and any world w, 〈w,m1〉 ∈ p if and only if 〈w,m2〉 ∈ p. (Cf. the notion of a boring set
of centered worlds in Egan 2006: 107.)
41See the discussion of the factivity condition on knowledge in §2.2 and the references therein.
42More precisely, a sentence has representational truth conditions if and only if its content can be modeled
by a set of worlds, or by a boring set of world, moral perspective pairs.
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semantics while preserving the core expressivist idea that moral assertions do not aim
to represent the world.43
7.2.2 The Psychological Stage: The Functional Role of Belief
So much for the semantics. The next step is to develop an account of the functional
roles of belief and desire. According to a popular line of thought, belief and desire are
interrelated dispositional states. Stalnaker famously suggested that, as a rst pass, we
could develop this thought as follows:
To desire that p is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it
about that p in a world in which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true.
To believe that p is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy
one’s desires, whatever they are, in a world in which p (together with one’s
other beliefs) were true. (1984: 15)
For our purposes, it will be helpful to employ a modal variant of this idea:
Desire (D) S desires (at w) p if and only if in all accessible worlds v where S’s beliefs (at
w) are true, A acts so as to fulll p (together with S’s other desires at w).
Belief (B) S believes (at w) p if and only if in all accessible worlds v where p (together
with S’s other beliefs at w) is true, S acts so as to fulll the desires S holds at w.
If there are accessible worlds where S’s beliefs and desires dier from S’s beliefs and
desires at the world of evaluation, this account runs into obvious counterexamples. Thus
we should impose the following constraint on the accessibility relation:
Psychological Sameness Constraint For any worlds w and v: v is accessible from w
only if S’s beliefs and desires are the same at v as at w.
Given this constraint, D and B oer a promising rst pass account of the functional
relations between desire and prosaic belief. But there is an obvious problem applying
this account to moral beliefs: B presupposes that moral beliefs are true at worlds. Ac-
cording to our non-representational truth conditions, moral contents are not true or false
at worlds, but only at world, moral perspective pairs.
43See Yalcin (2011) for a similar defense of the use of truth conditions in an expressivist semantics. Read-
ers may observe a resemblance between the expressivist truth conditions defended here and the assessor
relativist truth conditions defended by e.g., Kölbel (2003); Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007); Egan (2010,
2012); and MacFarlane (2014) for various classes of expressions. For present purposes, I will set aside the
question of whether there are important dierences between the two approaches. However, it is worth
noting that even if there is no important dierence in the truth conditions, there may still be important
dierences in the accompanying conceptions of belief. Assessor relativism about some subject matter is
typically paired with a cognitivist view of beliefs involving that subject matter, whereas I will be using the
expressivist truth conditions to implement a version of noncognitivism.
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Luckily, there is a straightforward way of extending D and B. Here’s the big-picture,
intuitive thought: for an agent to believe p is for her to be disposed to treat p as true
relative to her moral perspective.
To make this more precise, let mwS denote S’s moral perspective at w. (Think of this
as a specication of the contents of S’s moral attitudes atw.) We now give our functional
roles a noncognitivist twist:
Noncognitivist Desire (ND) S desires (at w) p if and only if in all accessible worlds v
such that S’s beliefs (at w) are true at 〈v,mvS〉, A acts so as to fulll p (together
with S’s other desires at w).
Noncognitivist Belief (NB) S believes (at w) p if and only if in all accessible worlds v
such that p (together with S’s other beliefs at w) is true at 〈v,mvS〉, S acts so as to
fulll the desires S holds at w.
These noncognitivist functional roles are conservative in the sense that they are
equivalent to our original modal conditions (D and B) when it comes to prosaic beliefs.
After all, the truth conditions for prosaic contents are insensitive to the moral perspec-
tive in the circumstance of evaluation.
So the dierence between the two characterizations of the functional roles of belief
and desire only emerges when we turn to moral beliefs. And it is here where we nally
get the noncognitivist explanation we sought. In particular, by combining ND and NB
with our expressivist semantics, we can derive the result that a moral belief—say, a belief
that charitable giving is good—is necessarily grounded in some conative attitude.
To see this, let’s look at how this approach validates the Modal Connection, according
to which certain conative attitudes—specically, the moral attitudes—are both necessary
and sucient for moral beliefs. Start with the necessity direction:
Necessity If S believes charitable giving is good, then S has the moral attitude towards
charitable giving.
To prove this, it will be helpful to use a consequence of our expressivist truth con-
ditions. Our truth conditions tell us that good is true at some 〈w,m〉 if and only if m
highly ranks charitable giving at w. Now consider the special instance of these truth
conditions where the moral perspective is S’s moral perspective at w (mwS ). We get the
result that good is true at 〈w,mwS 〉 if and only if mwS highly ranks charitable giving.
Given that moral perspectives are representations of moral attitudes, this in turn holds
if and only if S has the moral attitude, at w, towards charitable giving at w. So we have:
Truth-Desire Link good is true at 〈w,mwS 〉 if and only if S has the moral attitude, at
w, towards charitable giving.
Equipped with the Truth-Desire Link, we can now prove Necessity:
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Proof. Assume S believes good at some world w. Let v be any accessible world that
meets the following constraint: S’s beliefs (at w) are true at 〈v,mvS〉. So good is true
at 〈v,mvS〉. By Truth-Desire Link, it follows that at v S has the moral attitude towards
charitable giving. By the Psychological Sameness Constraint, it follows that at w S also
has the moral attitude towards charitable giving.
Two remarks about this proof are in order. First, this proof assumes that there is
at least one accessible world v such that S’s beliefs (at w) are true at 〈v,mvS〉. Is this
assumption warranted? The intuitive thought here is that all of your beliefs could have
been true—i.e., there’s at least one accessible circumstance of evaluation where all of
your beliefs come out true. Note that the prosaic version of this assumption—viz., that
there’s at least one accessible world where all of your prosaic beliefs come out true—is
already presupposed by our original functional roles for prosaic belief and desire (B and
D). This assumption is arguably an idealization; for example, it cannot capture agents
with inconsistent beliefs. But insofar as we are willing to make this idealization when it
comes to prosaic beliefs, we should be willing to make an analogous idealization when
it comes to moral beliefs.
Second, this proof did not actually use ND or NB. Rather, it used our expressivist truth
conditions, together with a particular presupposition of ND and NB (the assumption re-
marked on in the preceding paragraph). However, we do need ND and NB themselves—
not just their presupposition—in order to prove the other direction of the Modal Con-
nection, to which we now turn:
Suciency If S has the moral attitude towards charitable giving, S believes charitable
giving is good.
Proof. Assume that, at w, S has the moral attitude towards charitable giving. As before,
let v be some accessible world such that S’s beliefs (at w) are true at 〈v,mvS〉. Since S
has the moral attitude towards charitable giving at w, it follows, by the Psychological
Sameness Constraint, that S has the moral attitude towards charitable giving at v. By the
Truth-Desire Link, good is true at 〈v,mvS〉. Moreover, since S’s beliefs (at w) are all true
at 〈v,mvS〉, we can infer that at v S acts so as to fulll S’s desires at w (by ND (⇒)). Since
v was arbitrarily chosen, it follows that for every accessible world u such that good,
together with S’s other beliefs at w, is true at 〈u,muS〉, S acts so as to fulll the desires S
holds at w. By NB (⇐), S believes good at w.
So by combining our expressivist semantics with ND and NB, we validate the Modal
Connection. Of course, grounding noncognitivists ultimately want more than this; they
want a grounding connection. The foregoing account promises to deliver this as well.
According to the account just sketched, to hold some moral belief is to be in a particular
dispositional state—a state that depends on having a certain moral perspective. Clearly,
the dependence in question is metaphysical rather than causal. And so the conjunction of
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our expressivist semantics with NDB delivers what we sought: a principled explanation
of why moral beliefs are necessarily grounded in conative states.
Taking stock: here I’ve sketched one way of meeting the explanatory demand facing
grounding noncognitivism. The approach just sketched may well require renement. In
particular, it relied on a modal variant of a simple dispositional theory of belief and de-
sire. Both the simple dispositional theory and the modal variant thereof may well prove
too simple.44 In future work, I hope to explore in more detail the various options for for-
mulating a unitary functional role for moral beliefs and desires that delivers grounding
noncognitivism as a consequence.
7.3 How Is This Noncognitivism?
Let us now turn to consider another pressing question for grounding noncognitivism: is
the view noncognitivist in name only? Sure, the view forges a close connection between
conative attitudes and beliefs, but so do many versions of subjectivism. How, then, does
grounding noncognitivism merit its title?
By way of answer, it will be helpful to compare grounding noncognitivism in some
detail to one of the most sophisticated versions of subjectivism: Dreier’s speaker rela-
tivism (1990). On Dreier’s view, in any given context of utterance the content of a moral
expression such as ‘good’ will be some natural property selected by the contextually de-
termined moral perspective (‘moral system’, in Dreier’s parlance). To illustrate, suppose
that in the simplest case the contextually determined moral perspective is the speaker’s.
And suppose that Jane’s moral perspective gives top marks to actions that promote hap-
piness. Then the content of her utterance of (11) (‘Charitable giving is good’) will be the
proposition: Charitable giving promotes happiness.
There are at least two important dierences between grounding noncognitivism and
speaker relativism. The rst concerns their pictures of moral assertion. To use the termi-
nology introduced in §7.2.1, Dreier takes moral assertions to have representational truth
conditions. Thus for Dreier, the truth-value of Jane’s utterance of (11) depends on the
world and the world alone; it is true if the world is one where charitable giving promotes
happiness, false otherwise.
As a result, speaker relativism runs into familiar diculties when it comes to moral
disagreement. Recall vicious Vic, who values suering. When Vic scos:
(12) Charitable giving is not good!
he seems to disagree with Jane. Speaker relativists have trouble explaining this. After
all, the content of his utterance is a proposition such as Charitable giving does not pro-
mote suering, which is perfectly consistent with the content of Jane’s utterance of (11).
Speaker relativism likewise struggles to explain why Vic might respond to Jane’s utter-
ance by exclaiming, ‘That’s false!’, as well as why Jane might respond to Vic’s utterance
44For concerns about a simple dispositional theory, see Stampe 1986; Velleman 2000: chp.11.
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in kind.45
By contrast, while grounding noncognitivism can be implemented via dierent se-
mantic frameworks, we have seen that one natural implementation is the Gibbardian
approach developed in §7.2.1. On this semantics, the content of Jane’s utterance of (11)
is a particular set of world, moral perspective pairs: good. And the content of Vic’s
utterance of (12) is the set: {〈w,m〉 | m does not highly rank charitable giving at w}.
These two contents are inconsistent: there is no 〈w,m〉 that belongs to both. Hence this
framework has no trouble accounting for the intuition that Jane and Vic disagree. Our
Gibbardian machinery likewise explains why Jane and Vic will be inclined to deem each
others’ utterances false. The content of Jane’s utterance is false relative to Vic’s moral
perspective, and the content of his utterance is false relative to her moral perspective.46
Thus one important dierence between speaker relativism and grounding noncog-
nitivism (as developed here) concerns their rival pictures of moral assertion. A second—
and more crucial—dierence concerns their pictures of moral belief. What, according to
speaker relativism, is required for having a moral belief? As Dreier (2007) notes, when
Jane says:
(13) Vic believes that torture is good.
she does not seem to convey that Vic believes that torture instantiates the property
ranked highest by her moral perspective (promoting general happiness). More plausibly,
she conveys that Vic believes that torture instantiates the property ranked highest by his
moral perspective. Generalizing: ‘S believes x is good’ is true if and only if S believes that
x exhibits some property FS , where FS is whatever natural property is ranked highest
by S’s moral perspective.47
Thus developed, speaker relativism leads to a hybrid account of moral belief. After
all, the view holds that believing x is good requires both (i) possessing a prosaic belief
that x is F , (ii) possessing certain desire-like states that rank F highly. Consequently
the view faces the same diculties that arose for hybrid noncognitivism more generally
45Of course, speaker relativists are not without replies. See Dreier 2009 for detailed discussion of the
problem of disagreement; see Plunkett and Sundell 2013 for a general argument that disagreement does not
require inconsistency in content. Unfortunately, discussion of these responses would take me too far aeld.
For my purposes, it is enough to highlight that moral disagreement poses at least a prima facie challenge
for speaker relativism.
46Here I assume that people will be inclined to judge an utterance false if it is false relative to their
circumstance of evaluation. (In this regard, my approach more closely resembles assessor relativism than
speaker relativism—see fn. 43 and the references therein.) However, this inclination need not be indefeasible.
One might hold that its strength is aected by a variety of conversational factors, such as the question under
discussion. (See Beddor and Egan 2018 for an assessor relativist view of epistemic modals that incorporates
this sort of variability.)
47This account of moral beliefs is also necessary if the speaker relativist wants to underwrite motivational
internalism about belief, as opposed to motivational internalism about assertion. (If Jane’s utterance of (13)
conveyed that Vic believes that torture exhibits whatever property her moral perspective ranks most highly,
we’d have no reason to expect Vic to be motivated to act by the belief in question, except insofar as we have
reason to think that Vic’s moral perspective resembles Jane’s.)
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(§6). In particular, it faces the problem of explaining why Vic’s belief that torture is good
does not qualify as knowledge, or as epistemically rational, even though the prosaic
component of his belief has these statuses.
Grounding noncognitivism avoids this problem. After all, grounding noncognitivists
deny that moral belief is some distinct state composed of prosaic and conative elements.
Rather, they propose that moral belief has the very same functional role as prosaic belief.
Consequently, a moral belief gets its epistemic status in much the same fashion that any
prosaic belief does.
Some may think that this is too quick. After all, grounding noncognitivism doesn’t
actually tell us the conditions under which a belief—moral or prosaic—acquires some
particular epistemic status. While this is correct, grounding noncognitivism is easier to
integrate with standard epistemological answers to this question. For example, ground-
ing noncognitivists can help themselves to a standard-issue evidentialist view of epis-
temic rationality and justication, according to which S’s belief is epistemically ratio-
nal/justied if and only if S has suciently strong evidence in favor of its content. Of
course, many tricky details remain to be lled in—for example, explaining what it means
to have evidence in favor of some moral content—but, as we have seen, there are at least
some prima facie plausible ways of answering these questions.48 By contrast, Dreier
cannot adopt this simple evidentialist picture. After all, Vic’s belief that murder is good
is not epistemically rational, even though its content (that torture causes suering) is
well-supported by his evidence.
Grounding noncognitivism is thus importantly dierent from sophisticated subjec-
tivist views. Moreover, even if some readers remain reluctant to bestow the noncogni-
tivist title upon it, they should hopefully concede that the view captures many central
noncognitivist ideas. It captures the idea that moral beliefs do not aim to accurately rep-
resent the world. It likewise captures the Modal Connection, according to which one has
a moral belief if and only if one has a certain desire. As a result, it is compatible with the
Argument from Motivation. For my purposes, this is enough. Ultimately, the interesting
issue is not one of nomenclature—what’s in a name?—but rather what the view deliv-
ers. If I’m right, grounding noncognitivism delivers many core tenets of noncognitivism
without succumbing to the Epistemic Evaluability Challenge.
7.4 Why Aren’t Ordinary Desires Epistemically Evaluable?
A nal concern for grounding noncognitivism is that it overgenerates beliefs. If some
desire-like attitudes can ground beliefs, why can’t a non-moral desire, such as a desire
to quench my thirst, also ground a belief? But if it can, the Functional Role Hypothesis
48For example, in §5.3 I suggested understanding talk of evidential support as talk about the credences
one ought to adopt, where the ‘ought’ here is an expression of an epistemic attitude. (There I argued that
noncognitivists cannot appeal to this account insofar as they are trying to use evidence responsiveness to
explain the functional role of moral belief. This criticism does not apply to grounding noncognitivists who
adopt NDB, since NDB makes no reference to evidence responsiveness.)
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would seem to entail that the resulting belief is epistemically evaluable.
While this is a serious concern, grounding noncognitivists have two possible replies.
The rst is to embrace the supposedly objectionable consequence, but deny that the
consequence is, on examination, objectionable. According to this response, every desire-
like attitude grounds a normative belief, though only the moral attitude grounds moral
beliefs. For example, my desire to quench my thirst grounds a belief that it would be good
to quench my thirst. It’s just that the relevant sense of ‘good’ is prudential rather than
moral.49 Moreover, the response runs, this prudential belief is epistemically evaluable:
we can describe it as epistemically rational or irrational; under the right conditions, it
qualies as knowledge. And here too the epistemic evaluability of the belief is explained
by its functional role.
Doesn’t this lead to the conclusion that the desires in question are epistemically
evaluable, in contradiction to our starting observation (§2)? No. Recall that for ground-
ing noncognitivists, it is crucial to distinguish between the grounds and the grounded—
between the moral attitude and the moral belief that this attitude grounds. While the
moral belief is epistemically evaluable, the moral attitude is not (§7.1). Similarly, while
the prudential belief (that thirst-quenching is good) is epistemically evaluable, the under-
lying desire to quench my thirst is not. And the explanation for this is once again given
by the Functional Role Hypothesis: the desire to quench my thirst is not epistemically
evaluable because it does not play the B-role. And so this response is perfectly consis-
tent with our starting observation that it seems odd to describe desires as epistemically
rational, or as items of knowledge.
An alternative response is to deny that all desires ground beliefs. According to this
response, there is something special about the moral attitude in virtue of which it—and it
alone—gives rise to normative beliefs. What is this special something? Dierent answers
are possible, and a full assessment of the various alternatives will need to be left to future
work. However, let me briey sketch one potentially promising option.
Suppose we follow Blackburn in holding that part of what distinguishes the moral
attitude from ordinary desires is that it is important to us that others share our moral
attitudes. Given this importance, it would be useful to have a linguistic mechanism for
coordinating our moral attitudes. In particular, it would be useful to have a speech act
whose conventional function is to get one’s interlocutors to share one’s moral perspec-
tive. A speech act with the sort of Gibbardian content sketched in §7.2.1 is well-suited to
serve this role. Why is this? In contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, it’s
common to think of an assertion as a proposal to get one’s audience to believe its content
(Stalnaker 1978). By combining this picture of the pragmatic force of assertion with our
Gibbardian semantics, we get the result that when Jane asserts (11), she is proposing that
her interlocutors believe good. Given our account of what it is to believe a set of world,
moral perspective pairs (§7.2.2), anyone who believes this content will thereby come to
49A response along these lines is in line with Gibbard’s (2003) framework. On Gibbard’s view, all ‘ought’
judgments are planning states, and only some of these judgments are specically moral.
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have a moral perspective that assigns high marks to charitable giving. Thus Gibbardian
contents are apt vehicles for coordinating our moral attitudes: by making an assertion
with this sort of content, you not only express your moral perspective, you also try to
get your audience to share it.50
Of course, we could enrich our language with terms whose function is to coordi-
nate our non-moral desires. Were we to invent such terms, the semantics values of sen-
tences containing these terms would presumably be some sort of Gibbardian contents.51
However, according to the response under consideration, there is a reason why our lan-
guage lacks such terms. There is no need to coordinate our ordinary, non-moral desires,
whereas there is a need to coordinate our moral attitudes.
There are, then, two ways for grounding noncognitivists to respond to the overgen-
eration worry. First, they can let a thousand attitudes ground: all desires ground norma-
tive beliefs, and each of these is epistemically evaluable, though the underlying desire is
not. Second, they can nd some feature that distinguishes the moral attitude from other
desires, and then tell a story about why an attitude with this feature is uniquely suited
to ground moral beliefs.
8 Conclusion
Moral and prosaic beliefs are epistemically evaluable; ordinary desires are not. I’ve ar-
gued that this creates a problem for standard versions of noncognitivism, which take
moral beliefs to have a desire-like functional role. After raising diculties for some ini-
tial responses, I outlined a possible solution. The solution is to adopt a new form of
noncognitivism, according to which moral beliefs are grounded in desires. Unlike tra-
ditional versions of noncognitivism, this view preserves a unied functional role for all
beliefs, both moral and prosaic. As a result, it yields a simple solution to our problem:
moral and prosaic beliefs are both epistemically evaluable in virtue of their functional
role.52
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